Stopati vanzarea terenurilor patriei, catre straini!

Am vazut pe undeva o statistica – precis masluita de” producatorii ei ” care indica faptul ca 70% si mai bine dintre romani nu vor sa iasa din EU.
Daca e adevarat, e jale!
Se pare ca lumea e incapabila sa priceapa ca EU e o dictatura in mana unor gangsteri sindicalizati care lucreaza pentru Sorosh si Rotschild etc.
Daca Romania nu ia exemplul britanic, si mai ramane si in NATO care conform universitarului Daniele Ganser este cea mai mare organizatie mafiota din istoria omenirii, Romania nu va putea misca in front!
Putin e folosit ca sperietoare, caci nu are de gand sa faca razboaie neprovocat.
Cacci e vorba de un razboi atomic , si e perfect constient de pericolul total letal care ne paste intr-un astfel de conflict beligerent, pe noi toti.

NATO’s secret armies – Operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe By Daniele Ganser

CONTENTS

Foreword xi

Acknowledgements xiv

Acronyms xviii

Introduction 1

1 A terrorist attack in Italy 3

2 A scandal shocks Western Europe 15

3 The silence of NATO, CIA and MI6 25

4 The secret war in Great Britain 38

5 The secret war in the United States 51

6 The secret war in Italy 63

7 The secret war in France 84

8 The secret war in Spain 103

9 The secret war in Portugal 114

10 The secret war in Belgium 125

11 The secret war in the Netherlands 148

12 The secret war in Luxemburg 165

ix

13 The secret war in Denmark 168

14 The secret war in Norway 176

15 The secret war in Germany 189

16 The secret war in Greece 212

17 The secret war in Turkey 224

Conclusion 245

Chronology

Notes

Select bibliography

Index

250

259

301

303

x

FOREWORD

At the height of the Cold War there was effectively a front line in Europe. Winston

Churchill once called it the Iron Curtain and said it ran from Szczecin on the

Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. Both sides deployed military power along

this line in the expectation of a major combat. The Western European powers

created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) precisely to fight that

expected war but the strength they could marshal remained limited. The Soviet

Union, and after the mid-1950s the Soviet Bloc, consistently had greater numbers

of troops, tanks, planes, guns, and other equipment. This is not the place to pull

apart analyses of the military balance, to dissect issues of quantitative versus

qualitative, or rigid versus flexible tactics. Rather the point is that for many years

there was a certain expectation that greater numbers would prevail and the Soviets

might be capable of taking over all of Europe.

Planning for the day the Cold War turned hot, given the expected Soviet threat,

necessarily led to thoughts of how to counter a Russian military occupation of

Western Europe. That immediately suggested comparison with the Second World

War, when Resistance movements in many European countries had bedevilled

Nazi occupiers. In 1939-1945 the anti-Nazi Resistance forces had had to be

improvised. How much the better, reasoned the planners, if the entire enterprise

could be prepared and equipped in advance.

The executive agents in the creation of the stay-behind networks were

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States and the Secret

Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) of the United Kingdom. Other major actors

included security services in a number of European countries. In all cases identical

techniques were used. The intelligence services made an effort to establish

distinct networks for spying on the occupiers, that is espionage, and for sabotage,

or subverting an enemy occupation. To establish the networks the CIA and others

recruited individuals willing to participate in these dangerous activities, often

allowing such initial, or chief, agents to recruit additional sub-agents. Intelligence

services provided some training, placed caches of arms, ammunition, radio

equipment, and other items for their networks, and set up regular channels for

contact. The degree of cooperation in some cases ranged up to the conduct of

exercises with military units or paramilitary forces. The number of recruits for the

xi

secret armies ranged from dozens in some nations to hundreds or even thousands

in others.

The Resistance example was always an obvious one. Observers of the secret

Cold War assumed the existence of the networks; so there are occasional

references to the stay-behind networks in spy memoirs and literature. But by and

large the subject was acknowledged with a wink and a nod. Until almost the end

of the Cold War. In the summer of 1990, after the collapse of Soviet-dominated

regimes in Eastern Europe, but prior to the final disintegration of the Soviet Union,

the Italian government made public the existence of such a network in that

country. Over the years since there has been a recurrent stream of revelations

regarding similar networks in many European nations, and in a number of countries

there have been official investigations.

For the first time in this book, Daniele Ganser has brought together the full

story of the networks the Italians came to call ‘Gladio’. This is a significant and

disturbing history. The notion of the project in the intelligence services undoubtedly

began as an effort to create forces that would remain quiescent until war brought

them into play. Instead, in country after country we find the same groups of

individuals or cells originally activated for the wartime function beginning to

exercise their strength in peacetime political processes. Sometimes these efforts

involved violence, even terrorism, and sometimes the terrorists made use of the

very equipment furnished to them for their Cold War function. Even worse,

police and security services in a number of cases chose to protect the perpetrators

of crimes to preserve their Cold War capabilities. These latter actions resulted in the

effective suppression of knowledge of Gladio networks long after their activities

became not merely counterproductive but dangerous.

Mining evidence from parliamentary inquiries, investigative accounts,

documentary sources, trials, and individuals he has interviewed, Ganser tracks

the revelation of Gladio in many countries and fills in the record of what these

networks actually did. Many of their accomplishments were in fact antidemocratic,

undermining the very fabric of the societies they were meant to protect. Moreover, by

laying the records in different nations side by side, Ganser’s research shows a

common process at work. That is, networks created to be quiescent became activists

in political causes as a rule and not as an exception.

Deep as Dr Ganser’s research has been, there is a side to the Gladio story he

cannot yet reveal. This relates to the purposeful actions of the CIA, MI6 and

other intelligence services. Because of the secrecy of government records in the

United States, for example, it is still not possible to sketch in detail the CIA’s orders

to its networks, which could show whether there was a deliberate effort to interfere

with political processes in the countries where Gladio networks were active. There

were real efforts carried out by Gladio agents but their controllers’ orders remain in

the shadows, so it is not yet possible to establish the extent of the US role overall in the

years of the Cold War. The same is true of MI6 for Great Britain and for security

services elsewhere. At a minimum Dr Ganser’s record shows that capabilities

created for straightforward purposes as part of the Cold War ultimately turned to

xii

more sinister ends. Freedom of Information in the United States provides an avenue

to open up government documents; but that process is exceedingly slow and

subject to many exemptions, one of which is intended precisely to shield records

on activities of this type. The United Kingdom has a rule that releases documents

after a certain number of years, but there is a longer interval required for

documents of this type, and exceptions are permitted to government when documents

are finally released to the public. The information superhighway is barely a

macadam path when it comes to throwing light on the truth of the Gladio networks.

In this age of global concern with terrorism it is especially upsetting to discover

that Western Europe and the United States collaborated in creating networks that

took up terrorism. In the United States such nations are called ‘state sponsors’ and are

the object of hostility and sanction. Can it be the United States itself, Britain,

France, Italy, and others who should be on the list of state sponsors? The Gladio story

needs to be told completely so as to establish the truth in this matter. Daniele

Ganser has taken the critical first step down this road. This book should be read to

discover the overall contours of Gladio and to begin to appreciate the importance of

the final answers that are still lacking.

John Prados

Washington, DC

xiii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When looking for a PhD research topic in early 1998, I became interested in

the Gladio phenomenon, of which I had not previously heard. After some

research I realised that despite its great importance for the most recent political,

social and military history of Western Europe and the United States, only very

limited work had been carried out on the phenomenon of the secret NATO

armies, with no single study on the topic available in English. As the complex

structure of the network and the mysteries surrounding it increasingly caught my

interest, many well-meaning friends advised me against taking it as a PhD topic.

Very sensibly they argued that I would gain access neither to the archives of the

secret services, nor to primary data on the topic from NATO and its Office of

Security. Furthermore they predicted that the number of countries, which by the

end of my research had unexpectedly risen to fourteen, as well as the time frame

I intended to investigate in each of these countries, five decades, not only would

wear me out, but would also necessarily leave my findings fragmented and

incomplete. That in addition to these problems I would have to work with texts

in more than ten different European languages, of which I personally could

only read five, made matters crystal clear: Gladio was not a suitable PhD research

topic.

With great fascination for the phenomenon, a certain degree of youthful

stubbornness, and above all a supportive environment I nevertheless embarked upon

the research project and dedicated the next four years of my life to the investigation.

At the time my determination to proceed, and my ability to convince my advising

professors, was based on one single original document from the Italian military

secret service SIFAR, dated June 1, 1959 and entitled ‘The special forces of SIFAR

and Operation Gladio’. This document proved that a CIA- and NATO-linked

secret army code-named Gladio had existed in Italy during the Cold War, yet further

original documents were very hard to come by. In retrospect I therefore have to

admit that my well-meaning friends had been right. For among the numerous

obstacles that arose during the years of research many were the ones predicted.

First of all, the field of research was indeed large, both as to the number of

countries, and to the time frame. I started with a focus on Italy, where operation

xiv

Gladio was exposed in 1990. Based on the Italian sources I quickly realised,

however, that the so-called stay-behind armies had existed in all 16 NATO countries

during the Cold War. Further research led me to conclude that of the 16

NATO countries both Iceland, with no armed forces, and Canada, far removed

from the Soviet frontier, could be neglected. Yet, while I was somewhat relieved

to calculate that this would leave me wi t h the analysis of stay-behind armies

in 14 countries, I found with a certain surprise that secret stay-behind armies with

indirect links to NATO had also existed in the four neutral countries, Sweden,

Finland, Austria and my native Switzerland, during the Cold War. In this book

I am presenting the data for the NATO countries only. A forthcoming publication

will deal specifically with the equally sensitive issues of secret NATO-linked

stay-behind armies in the neutral countries.

Next to the challenges that arise with respect to the number of countries, gathering

data for each single country too proved difficult. It was most distressing

that governments, NATO and secret services withheld requested documents

despite a FOIA request to the CIA, numerous letters to NATO, and official

requests to European governments. Next to only a very small number of primary

documents, the analysis had therefore to be based on numerous secondary sources,

including parliamentary reports, testimonies of persons involved as reported by

the international press, articles, books and documentaries, needless to say, such

secondary sources can never be a substitute for the original primary documents,

and all future research must clearly aim for access to primary documents.

If, however, the data presented hereafter first of all enables researchers to gain an

overview of a phenomenon which otherwise might have remained inaccessible,

and in the second place enables processes which in the future will lead to access

to primary documents, then the main purposes of this book will have been

achieved.

That despite the mentioned numerous obstacles, the years of intensive research

have led to a hopefully valuable international analysis of the stay-behind armies

and the secret war in Western Europe is to a large degree attributable to the

international professional help and support that I was allowed to enjoy. First of

all I want to thank my two academic advisers for their truly valuable assistance,

Professor Georg Kreis of Basel University, and Professor Jussi Hanhimaki of the

Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, formerly with the London

School of Economics and Political Science where we met in a most stimulating

environment. Their feedback on numerous drafts sharpened my questions when

they were too vague. Their frank criticism helped me to focus on the secret armies

when I was drifting away. And their experience in the field of academic research

restrained my judgement, and opened the way for a balanced understanding.

When I presented my Gladio research and passed my final PhD exams in September

2001, we all felt that it was a timely book, for in that month, investigations into

international terrorism had become a high priority on the agenda. During the

subsequent years we have in a very strange way become accustomed to living in

a world that suffers from both war and terrorism, and my warm thanks therefore

xv

also go to Professor Andreas Wenger, Director of the Center for Security Studies

in Zurich, for his support for future research into Gladio and terrorism here at the

institute.

Furthermore my gratitude goes to Washington-based CIA author William

Blum who first drew my attention to Gladio and taught me a lot on covert action and

secret warfare. Very warm thanks also go to Professor Noam Chomsky in Boston

who not only encouraged my research, but also provided me with valuable contacts

during our meetings in the United States and in Switzerland. In Cambridge,

Professor Christopher Andrew supported my research, while in Washington,

Professor Christopher Simpson drew my attention to interesting contacts in the

United States. In Austria, Professor Siegfried Beer provided me with valuable

data and kindly encouraged my research. In London, finally, I copied numerous

valuable documents at the Statewatch institute, where Trevor Hemmings proved

to me how excellent work can be done with little money.

It must be stated here at the outset of the book that all quotes other than from

English originals are translations by the author, who alone bears responsibility

for their accuracy. At the same time it goes without saying that the numerous

countries could not have been investigated without the help of my international

network, which assisted me both in the initial phase of locating and getting hold

of the documents, and during subsequent translation hours. In Germany I want to

thank journalist and Gladio author Leo Miiller, as well as Erich Schmidt

Eenboom from the research institute on peace and politics. In the Netherlands,

Dr Paul Koedijk and Dr Cees Wiebes, as well as Frans Kluiters, all members of

the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association, kindly shared with me valuable

Gladio material and interesting days in Amsterdam, while academic Micha de

Roo assisted me with the Dutch translations. In Denmark, I want to thank Professor

Paul Villaume of Copenhagen University who shared interesting data with me,

and Eva Ellenberger of Basel University who helped me to understand the Danish

texts. In Norway, I want to thank my friend Pal Johansen for our excellent time at

the London School of Economics and Political Science and his professional help

in crucial times when it came to the translation of Norwegian texts. In Austria,

journalist Markus Kemmerling and the Zoom political magazine supported my

research. In Basel, Ali Burhan Kirmizitas helped me greatly with the translation

of Turkish texts and provided me with important documents on Gladio in Turkey.

Academic Ivo Cunha kindly shared with me data on Gladio in Portugal and in

Spain, while my university friends Baptiste Blanch and Francisco Bouzas

assisted me with the Portuguese and Spanish translations. My friend and fellow

academic Martin Kamber finally had the energy to plough through an early PhD

manuscript of over a thousand pages, whereupon he wisely let me know that the

text had to be shortened. Thanks to Ruth Eymann I was able to retreat to a both

beautiful and silent chalet in a remote valley of the Swiss mountains to carry out

that task.

After the PhD thesis had been accepted insigni cum laude at the history department

of Basel University in Switzerland, Prank Cass and Andrew Humphrys of

XVI

Taylor and Francis, UK, and Kalpalathika Rajan of Integra Software Services,

India, helped me greatly to make my research publicly accessible on the global

book market. Last but not least, complete research independence was guaranteed

by the generous financial support of The Swiss National Science Foundation, the

Janggen-Pohn Stiftung in St Gallen, the Max Geldner Stiftung in Basel, and the

Frewillige Akademische Gesellschaft in Basel. Special thanks go to my mother,

my father and my sister, to Sherpa Hanggi, Marcel Schwendener, Tobi Poitmann,

Dane Aebischer, Rene Ab Egg, Laurenz Bolliger, Philipp Schweighauser, Niko

Bally, Yves Pierre Wirz and Andi Langlotz for numerous inspiring and controversial

late-night discussions on international politics, global trends and problems,

and our personal quest for happiness and meaning in life.

Daniele Ganser

Sils Maria, Switzerland

xvii

Când e doliu naţional, „Turcu’ plăteşte!” PDF
Imprimare Email
Ion Maldarescu
Miercuri, 10 August 2016 23:30
Inmormantarea AneiNe naştem, creştem, trăim cum putem şi, firesc, ajungem la finalul imprescriptibil când ne dăm obştescul sfârşit. Niciodată nu isprăvim ce ne-am pus în gând, pentru că Doamna cu coasa vine când vrea ea să-şi ia haraciul, nu când vrem noi. Nimic anormal până aici. Cu nişte ani în urmă scriam că televiziunea este un instrument eficace, o modalitate de control al minţii, la fel sau chiar mult mai nocivă decât oricare alt drog. Drogurile sunt o ameninţare la adresa ordinii sociale, însă televiziunea este un drog care creează dependenţă, controlat şi distribuit de nişte diabolici, un drog care ne transformă în mutanţi, ne alterează raţiunea, făcând aproape imposibilă dorinţa de evadare din vicisitudinile realităţii cotidiene. De peste 26 de ani se practică spălarea creierelor, prin strategii şi tehnici subtile care, cuplate cu efectul televizorului asupra undelor creierului, fac să pară infantilă ingeniozitatea celor mai erudiţi psihologi. Ce şi-ar putea dori mai mult un guvern sau organizaţiile din umbră decât o masă de zombie uşor manevrabili? Cam pe-aici a ajuns „Starea Naţiunii” în ţara Marelui Mut.

De câteva zile, mass-media din România (nu neapărat românească) a umplut eterul şi sticla televizoarelor cu un dramatism grotesc, anunţând ştirea că o falsă „regină a Românei” a plecat la cele veşnice la vârsta de 92 de ani! Minciună şi falsificare a adevărului istoric! N-a murit nicio „regină”! România este Republică! N-are nici rege, nici regină, nici prinţi! Conform exprimării dintr-un alt context al culturnicei Biro Rozalia – unul dintre clasicii guvernamentali în viaţă -, a murit „o persoană bipedă”. Anna Antoinette Francoise Charlotte Zita Marguerite de Bourbon-Parma s-a căsătorit cu Mihai-viteză, un pierde vară la propriu, „un nevoiaş al minţii”, cum l-a numit marele Pamfil Şeicaru – pe data de 10 iunie 1948, în Grecia, adică după o jumătate de an de când trădătorul-donator de la 23 august 1944 abdicase şi nu mai era rege. Nu oricum, la înţelegere cu guvernul Petru Groza, contra unei rente viagere substanţiale (pe care i-a retezat-o „împuşcatul” în anii ’70), başca calabalâcul de bunuri cu care deja plecase cu puţin înainte de abdicare. Astfel, în România anului 2016, eroii neamului sunt puşi la index, iar paraziţii, urcaţi la loc de cinste. Se poate afirma că Ţara a devenit un spaţiu concentraţionar, unde unii intră pe „porţile regilor” iar alţii iau calea exilului.

Pe vremea lui Al. Ghica, în timpul judecării unui proces în care erau implicaţi un negustor român şi unul turc, unul dintre boierii divanului a adormit. Trezit ca să-şi spună părerea, el a rostit automat: „Turcul plăteşte!”, ceea ce nu era corect, turcul fiind nevinovat. Cam aşa se petrece şi astăzi la curtea iohannisto-cioloşistă. Dacă Ana de Bourbon-Parma, pe lângă cetăţenia franceză a avut şi alte cetăţenii, nu cunosc, dar cetăţenia română şi statutul regină, BA! Ana nu a avut niciodată coroană regală, nu a cerut cetăţenie română şi nici nu a încercat să înveţe limba română. Atunci, pentru ce atâta mascaradă? Cine suportă cheltuielile? „Turcu’ plăteşte!” Adică, poporul român. Nimic nu justifică marele tam-tam şi amploarea care se dau evenimentului şi afirmaţiei mincinoase, inclusiv cheltuielile aferente, dar, cum ziceam, „Turcu’ plăteşte!” „Casa (ne)regală” a beneficiat de bunuri şi proprietăţi, a încasat şi păpat banii românilor, dar a refuzat să achite impozitele datorate statului român, implorând autorităţile să-i anuleze datoriile. Preşedinţia, Guvernul şi ocupanţii fotoliilor Casei Poporului – care nu mai este a poporului român, ci a Clubului „Ali Baba şi centurionii adormiţi ai neamului” – au fost de acord. A scutit-o de taxe şi impozite pentru că… „Turcu’ plăteşte!”.

De mai bine de o jumătate de an, hârleţele, târnăcoapele şi buldozerele au fost puse la treabă să construiască, la curtea de Argeş o necropolă pentru oase „regale”. Şi pentru asta, tot „Turcu’ plăteşte!”, nu „casa regală” a republicii România. Dacă timp de o viaţă, Ana şi consortul – despre care nu se mai ştie aproape nimic, iar gurile rele bârfesc că ar locui prin cine ştie ce frigider elveţian – au stat departe de ţara asta, de ce nu-i înmormântează acolo? Răspunsul este simplu: pentru că, acolo, cheltuielile de înmormântare le-ar suporta „beneficiarul”. Aici, „Turcu’ plăteşte!”. Şi mai e ceva: pentru că, tot „Turcu’ plăteşte!”, va fi o înmormântare cu repetiţie. „Un balamuc macabru nemaîntâlnit la nicio casă de nebuni din Uniunea Europeană”.

Dacă ar mai fi trăit, nici măcar Giuseppe Verdi nu ar fi putut imagina o versiune modernizată mai reuşită a lui, Nabucco, adaptată la jalnica „Stare a Naţiunii” române. Sicriul cu cetăţeana franceză Ana de Bourbon-Parma a fost adus din Elveţia, pe calea aerului, la Bucureşti. Sine die, tot „Turcu’ plăteşte!”. Ne-a fost oferită o scenă umilitoare, premeditată aş spune, ilustrând cât de jos s-a prăbuşit demnitatea mioritică: militarii din Regimentul de Gardă poartă pe umeri un copârşeu neromânesc acoperit cu o cârpă blazonată – nu cu Tricolorul românesc – şi se derulează protocolul cuvenit unui om de stat, unui erou sau martir al Neamului. Semn al sclaviei! În cazul de faţă, „Corul robilor” din opera italianului nu este altcineva decât poporul român, reprezentat de militarii unei armate decimate, ce duce pe umeri un sicriu străin cu însemne străine. Ana de Bourbon nu a făcut nimic pentru a servi interesele României, ba, s-ar putea spune că i-a iubit pe români la fel de tare ca Elena, cea care l-a zâmislit (nu se ştie precis cu care colonel grec) pe Mihai I, donatorul pământului şi bogăţiilor Ţării, ruşilor, în urmă cu 72 de ani, la 23 august 1944. În 1946, pentru infamia Regelui, a plătit Mareşalul. Astăzi, „Turcu’ – poporul român – plăteşte!”. regina-mamă

Când a murit Florin Constantiniu, administratorul de la Bellu nu era de găsit, aşa că l-au înmormântat în grabă la Cimitirul Militar Ghencea. Când Gheorghe Buzatu a plecat la întâlnirea cu Iorga şi Mareşalul, oficialităţile abia au catadicsit să facă un gest. Cei doi au slujit interesele Istoriei naţionale „sincere” nu a uneia falsificate. Acum, când „persoana bipedă” care n-a avut nimic de-a face cu Ţara şi Neamul şi-a dat duhul, „toată floarea cea vestită” a papagalilor oficiali varsă lacrimi de crocodil şi declară doliu naţional. De ce? Ziua de sâmbătă, zi de 13, cu ghinion şi cu ale ei trei ceasuri rele… navetistul săptămânal, şeful guvernului şi hoarda autohtonă a lui Ali Baba vor fi alături de „suferinţa” paraziţilor „casei regale”, paranghelie pentru care tot „Turcu’ plăteşte!” Cineva, „persoană importantă, nu spui cine”, tare şi pe drept supărat, îmi scria: „[…] ieri m-au apucat dracii auzind la televizor că a murit regina Ana. A cui regină? Doliu naţonal? Ce a făcut pentru Naţiunea asta? Mai mult a făcut Elena Ceauşescu, zău dacă nu! O spun oriunde, oricui, oricând, deşi am urât-o pe Leana lu’ nea Nicu şi o urăsc şi acuma, dar pentru naţiunea asta, ea a făcut mai mult decât Ana-recent decedată. Ca să mă răzbun, mi-am organizat un chiolhan chiar pe 13 august. Nu glumesc! […] am profitat de faptul că se împlinesc nişte de ani de la cununia civilă chiar pe 13 august anul asta! Aşa că…. Dacă ştiţi pe cineva dispus să mă toarne la D.N.A., la Miliţie, la Guvern, că îmi permit să calc în picioare doliul naţional, v-aş fi recunoscător. Aş vrea să-mi sune ăia la uşă şi să auda ce le-aş zice eu. Da’ să vină mai spre seară, să apuce vinul să mi se urce şi la cap, nu doar să-mi coboare în picioare”. Are dreptate şi – ştiu că nu-i creştineşte -, dar mai că-mi vine să pun şi eu de-o sârbă oltenească. Tot pe 13!, că de, „Turcu’ plăteşte!”.
http://www.art-emis.ro/editoriale/3687.html